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RECENT DECISIONS
a serious crime, as it has now come to be understood, and which,
under the present law, is ill-defined and arbitrarily applied.
Until the proposed revision is adopted the holding in the
instant case will have a marked effect on prior precedent. Since
the Court limited the applicability of the statute to kidnaping in
the conventional sense, no longer will detention alone as in Cowan,
or detention and asportation as in Florio, be sufficient to con-
stitute the wholly independent crime of kidnaping. Rather, the
Court limits the statute to conduct as that found in Black where
the restraint constituted the completely separate crime of kidnaping.
However, it is difficult to predict the effect of the instant decision
to other factual situations since the Court expressly indicates that
whether or not the conduct will constitute the separate crime
of kidnaping depends on the facts and circumstances involved. In
any event, the Court has sharply curtailed the applicability of the
present penal statute. No longer will an individual be convicted of
kidnaping, one of our most serious crimes, when his conduct is merely
incidental to the commission of another crime.
X
CRIM!INAL PROCEDURE - CONFESSIONS - Nnw PROCEDURE
GOVERNING ADmISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONS APPLIED RETROAC-
TIVELY. - In 1960, defendant was convicted of robbery in the
first degree after a trial in which, pursuant to New York
procedure, the issue of the voluntariness of his confession was
submitted to the same jury that determined his guilt. The appellate
division affirmed the conviction and the court of appeals, denied
defendant's application for leave to appeal. Subsequently, the
New York procedure was declared unconstitutional by the United
States Supreme Court in the case of Jackson v. Denno.1 The
New York Court of Appeals, after favorably reconsidering de-
fendant's application, held that although defendant ordinarily could
claim no further appellate relief, he was entitled to a redetermina-
tion on the admissibility of his confession. The Court stated that
a coram nobis motion is the appropriate procedure for contesting
such prior convictions,2 and that the "Massachusetts procedure"
would be used in future trials to determine the admissibility of
allegedly coerced confessions. People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72,
204 N.E.2d 179, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1965).
Whether retroactive application should be given to newly
declared law is a problem to which history has not supplied
1378 U.S. 368 (1964).
2 For a detailed analysis of the coram nobis motion, see Comment, 57
Nw. U.L. REv. 467 (1962).
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a consistent answer. 3 This issue has recently assumed added social
significance due to the expanded concepts of due process in state
criminal proceedings pronounced by the Supreme Court. These
changes, coupled with the Court's refusal to issue a compre-
hensive statement on the issue of retroactivity, have raised the
question of whether the state courts are required to apply these
new concepts to prior convictions.
In the case of Griffin v. Illinois,4 the Supreme Court held un-
constitutional a state court's denial of a copy of a trial record
to an indigent defendant. However, the majority failed to mention
the possible retroactive effect of this decision. Subsequently, the
Supreme Court held, on similar facts, that a prisoner who had
been convicted twenty-three years earlier was presently entitled
to relief based upon Griffin.5 It is unclear whether, by this decision,
the Court anticipated blanket retroactive application of its new
decisions or simply applied Griffin to the exigencies of this par-
ticular situation.6 In any event, a contemporary constitutional
concept was applied to an earlier factual situation.
Perhaps the most celebrated addition to the concept of due
process occurred in 1961 in the case of Mapp v. Ohio.7  As in
Griffin, the Court did not consider the effect of its holding upon
prior convictions.8 However, in the case of People v. Loria,9
the New York Court of Appeals limited the retroactivity of Mapp
to those who, at the time of that decision, were still within the
"normal appellate process." 10
3For an historical analysis of retroactivity considered in light of con-
temporary case law, see Bender, The Retroactive Effect of an Overruling
Constitutional Decision: Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 650 (1963). See
also Stimson, Retroactive Application of Law- A Problem in Constitu-
tional Law, 38 MicH. L. REv. 30 (1939); Note, 60 HARv. L. REv. 437 (1947).
4351 U.S. 12 (1956).
5 Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles, 357
U.S. 214 (1958). A New York prisoner convicted prior to the Griffin
decision was granted similar relief in Reatz v. United States, 375 U.S. 16(1963).
G See Torcia & King, The Mirage of Retroactivity and Changing Con-
stitutional Concepts, 66 DIcK. L. REv. 269, 271-73 (1962).
7367 U.S. 643 (1961).
s However, the Mapp case did contain an ambiguously phrased footnote
which has given rise to various conflicting inferences regarding retroactivity.
Id. at 659 n.9. For a discussion of the problems raised by the footnote, see
Bender, supra note 3. See United States ex rel. Angelet v. Fay, 333 F.2d
12, 15 (2d Cir. 1964) ; United States ex rel. Gregory v. New York, 195 F.
Supp. 527, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
9 10 N.Y.2d 368, 179 N.E.2d 478, 223 N.Y.S.2d 462 (1961). See gen-
erally Note, 28 BROoKLYN L. Rav. 345 (1962).
10 The appellate process is deemed at an end when leave to appeal is
denied by the court of appeals. People v. Muller, 11 N.Y.2d 154, 182 N.E.2d
99, 227 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1962). To be eligible for relief, objection must have
been raised at the trial to the introduction of the allegedly inadmissible
evidence. People v. Friola, 11 N.Y.2d 157, 182 N.E.2d 100, 227 N.Y.S.2d
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In New York, a coram nobis motion has been held inappropriate
for prisoners who did not qualify for relief under Loria, and
only recently federal habeas corpus has been denied to pre-Mapp
New York prisoners. 2 In addition, it is interesting to note
that the federal courts apparently have not allowed collateral relief
to prisoners convicted prior to Weeks v. United States,13 the federal
equivalent and predecessor to Map p.14
In the case of Gideon v. Wainwright,'5 the Supreme Court
once more added to its definition of due process in state proceedings.
Subsequently, the Florida Supreme Court denied applications by
several pre-Gideon prisoners seeking to set aside their convictions.
The United States Supreme Court reversed in a memorandum
opinion based solely upon Gideon,'6 thereby applying Gideon
retroactively.
The recent constitutional development which gave rise to the
decision in the instant case was the holding in Jackson v. DennoY'
which deemed unconstitutional the New York procedure for de-
termining the admissibility of confessions. This procedure con-
sisted of the submission of the confession, for a determination
of voluntariness, to the same jury who decided guilt. Only the
dissent discussed the issue of retroactivity, and it did so dis-
approvingly.
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals provided the new
procedure for determining the voluntariness of a confession as
necessitated by Jackson, and considered its applicability to prior
convictions. Chief Judge Desmond, speaking for the majority,
stated that although the defendant had exhausted the normal
appellate process, he was entitled to additional relief because Jackson
apparently mandated such relief, inasmuch as Jackson himself had
already exhausted his state appellate remedies.'"
The Court stated that mere submission of the issue of vol-
untariness to the jury was a sufficient predicate for Jackson-type
relief. This was in contrast to prior New York holdings which
423 (1962). Such objection must be raised specifically. People v. O'Neill,
11 N.Y.2d 148, 182 N.E.2d 95, 227 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1962).
"1 People v. Eastman, 18 App. Div. 2d 1102, 239 N.Y.S.2d 972 (2d Dep't
1963); People v. Moore, 34 Misc. 2d 228, 223 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Ct. Gen. Sess.
1962).
12 United States ex rel. Angelet v. Fay, 333 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1964);
United States ex rel. Eastman v. Fay, 333 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1964).
"3232 U.S. 383 (1914).1 Bender, supra note 3, at 656.
15372 U.S. 335 (1963).
" Pickelsimer v. Wainvright, 375 U.S. 2 (1963); see United States
ex rel. Durocher v. LaVallee, 330 F2d 303 (2d Cir. 1964).
'1 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
'1 People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 74, 204 N.E.2d 179, 181, 255 N.Y.S.
2d 838, 840 (1965).
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had required objection to the allegedly inadmissible evidence at the
trial level to be eligible for Mapp post-conviction relief. 19
The majority further stated that hearings on the issue of
voluntariness would be provided for those no longer in the
appellate process by coram nobis motion. This procedure involves
petitioning the trial court for a hearing, preferably before the
same judge who presided over the conviction. The Court also
provided that the trial record would be employed to re-examine
the issue of voluntariness without prejudice to the submission of
new evidence by either side. Should the judge find the confession
voluntary, the conviction would stand, but if he found it to have
been coerced, such finding would be added to the record for
submission to the appropriate court.
With respect to future trials, the Court adopted the "Mass-
achusetts procedure" which was sanctioned as constitutionally
valid in Jackson v. Denno. Under this procedure, the trial judge,
at a separate hearing, must find voluntariness beyond a reasonable
doubt before submitting the confession to the jury.20
In a vigorous dissenting opinion, Judge Van Voorhis claimed
that the granting of federal collateral relief in Jackson did not
necessitate the granting of similar state relief in Huntley. The
states, he argued, have inherent power to limit the relief available
to those outside the normal appellate process. Thus, although
the scope of federal habeas corpus relief was expanded by the
Supreme Court over a decade ago, the passage of time has
necessitated no parallel enlargement of state collateral remedies.
The dissent further indicated that if the Supreme Court considered
it necessary to supplement the present state post-conviction relief,
the federal system was a sufficient framework for such action.
Finally, Judge Van Voorhis concluded that the protections pro-
duced by Jackson v. Denno were insufficient to justify the over-
burdening of the New York courts, and in this case, the Court
should not attempt to have "the past . . . reformed in the image
of the present," 21 but should limit Jackson relief to the normal
appellate process.
It seems that the instant case is in consonance with the
Supreme Court trend which has expanded the scope of due process
in order to justify the issuance of a mandate that new law be
applied to prior proceedings. The sequels to Griffin and Gideon
indicate that the Court will order application of newly pronounced
concepts to prior state convictions. However, these decisions
19 People v. Friola, supra note 10.
20The majority construed the New York Constitution (art. I, § 2) as
requiring a jury trial on this issue, indicating that this was a dominant
factor in the adoption of the Massachusetts procedure.




have not yet amounted to a blanket requirement of full re-
troactivity.
As previously indicated, the Court in the instant case dis-
tinguished the relief made available to pre-Mapp prisoners by the
appellate procedures used in Mapp and Jackson themselves. Since
Mapp arose on direct appeal, the states could limit its retro-
active application to cases in the normal appellate process. On
the other hand, Jackson, which was instituted by collateral attack
after all state relief was exhausted, necessarily precluded such
limitation on applicability.
It has been suggested, however, that the limited retroactivity
afforded to Mapp, and the complete retroactivity directed by the
courts for Gideon and Griffin as well as Jackson, is a mani-
festation of fundamental differences in the due process rights
involved. 22 In regard to Mapp, it is argued that although evidence
seized in violation of the fourth amendment involves an uncon-
stitutional invasion of privacy, there is no claim that such evidence
is tainted by some fundamental unfairness, and thus a conviction
based thereupon violates no element of due process. 23  Mapp was
meant to serve, it is further maintained, primarily as a deterrent
to oppressive police conduct, and to apply retroactivity would merely
let "the criminal ... go free because the constable has blundered." 24
Although the coram nobis motion, when employed as directed
by the instant case, would offer many practical advantages,
25 it
should be noted that, traditionally, coram nobis in New York
has been limited, with a few exceptions, 26 to facts which could
not be raised on appeal.2 7  Additionally, one noted authority has
speculated that procedural innovations necessitated by the instant
case can only in full measure be met by statutory enactment. 28
22 Mr. Justice Frankfurter espoused a similar view: retroactivity should
be determined in each case by the same "considerations that give prospective
content to a new pronouncement of law." Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 26(1956) (concurring opinion).
23 United States ex rel. Angelet v. Fay, supra note 12, at 17-20.
24 People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
25Under this procedure, the appellate courts are not burdened with nu-
merous petitions for relief; there is less procedural "red-tape" and the issue
is considered by the same judge (if still available) who presided at the
original trial.
State habeas corpus relief was found unsuited to effect the hearings
necessitated by Jackson v. Dento because, inter alia, the writ is returnable
only in the county where defendant was detained which, in many cases,
will not be the county of trial. People v. Huntley, supra note 18, at 76, 204
N.E.2d at 182, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 842.
26 Coram nobis relief has been held available to contest convictions in-
volving a denial of counsel. Id. at 79-80, 204 N.E.2d at 184, 255 N.Y.S.2d
at 845 (dissenting opinion).
27 Ibid. See generally Comment, 57 Nw. U.L. Rzv. 467 (1962).
28 Shapiro, Confessions in Criminal Cases, pt. 2, 153 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 16,
1965, p. 1, col. 4, p. 4, col. 8.
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The use of the coram nobis motion raises several noteworthy
problems. For example, while the majority assumed that the trial
judge will be available for the hearing, there is no such guaranty.
Moreover, all other parties originally involved might likewise be
unavailable because of death, incompetency, change of residence,
or the like. Thus, when only one aspect of a trial is reconsidered
from the cold record of a case long since concluded, the adjudication
might well be unreliable. In addition, the record may have been
lost, destroyed, or discarded. Without a record, who is to challenge
the prisoner's claim that there was a coerced confession? The
prosecutor may well have relied upon the confession, and now-
five, ten, or twenty years later-is unable to make out a prima facie
case.
Aside from the difficulties of administering the procedure
directed in Huntley (coram nobis), there appear to be further
problems in the application of the "Massachusetts procedure"
regarding the voluntariness of confessions. It may well be argued
that the new procedure will afford fewer protections to the prisoner
than the old. The trial judge, long accustomed to the New York
procedure, may have a tendency to continue to submit all con-
fessions to the jury where conflicting inferences could be drawn,
rather than determining voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt. 9
Furthermore, the jury might become aware of the judicial finding
of voluntariness and then be reluctant to set it aside.30
The decision in Huntley, and its foreboding of possible complete
retroactive application, could have severe effects on the prosecutor.
In the future, rather than risk a new trial, the prosecutor may
induce the defendant to plead guilty to a lesser offense, thereby
compromising his obligation to the community. Furthermore, to
compound the prosecutor's dilemma, the defendant may employ
the coram nobis motion in an attempt to challenge prior con-
victions for which his sentence has already been served, in an
attempt to mitigate the penalty for a present conviction.
It is more than likely that state legislation will ensue to
mitigate the limitations imposed upon the prosecutor by this case.
The Mapp case brought about the enactment of the "stop and
frisk" and "no-knock" laws, and one might well expect an analogous
result as a development of Huntley in the not so distant future.31
29 People v. Huntley, supra note 18, at 85, 204 N.E.2d at 188, 255 N.Y.S.
2d at 850 (dissenting opinion).
30 Shapiro, supra note 28, p. 4, col. 7.
a' See S. Int. 2750, Pr. 2891, A. Int. 4752, Pr. 4875 (1965).
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